Dividend decisions in the property and liability insurance industry: Mutual versus stock companies by Zhu, M et al.
Title Dividend decisions in the property and liability insuranceindustry: Mutual versus stock companies
Author(s) Zou, H; Yang, C; Wang, M; Zhu, M
Citation Review Of Quantitative Finance And Accounting, 2009, v. 33 n. 2,p. 113-139
Issued Date 2009
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/188460
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652167 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652167
 
 
Dividend Decisions in the Property & Liability Insurance Industry:  
Mutual versus Stock Companies 
 
 
Hong Zou* 
Department of Economics and Finance 
City University of Hong Kong 
83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, 
Hong Kong, China 
Email: hongzou@cityu.edu.hk 
Tel: (852) 2788 7880 
Fax: (852) 2788 8842 
 
 
Chuanhou Yang 
School of Finance, Insurance, and Economics 
Florida Atlantic University 
777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431  
Email: cyang1@fau.edu 
Tel: (1) 561-297-4181  
 
Mulong Wang 
Grange Mutual Insurance Company 
Columbus, OH 43202, U.S.A. 
Email: michael.wang101@gmail.com 
 
 
Minglai Zhu 
School of Business Administration 
Nankai University 
Tianjin, China 300210 
Email: zhuml@nankai.edu.cn 
 
 
This version: 13 May 2008 
Accepted by Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
 
*Correspondence author. We thank Cheng-Few Lee (editor-in-chief) and an anonymous referee for helpful 
suggestions. Comments from Arthur Hau, Stan Hoi, William Shafer, Minming Wen and participants at the 
Seoul annual meeting of Asia Pacific Risk and Insurance Association (APRIA) are also appreciated. 
However, the usual disclaimer applies. Zou acknowledges the financial support from the Research and 
Postgraduate Studies Panel (RPSP) of Lingnan University.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652167 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652167
 
 ii
 
Dividend Decisions in the Property & Liability Insurance Industry:  
Mutual versus Stock Companies 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This article examines the effect of organizational forms on corporate dividend decisions 
by exploring the differences in dividend payout ratios between mutual and stock 
property-liability (P-L) insurers in the U.S. Our large sample evidence suggests: a) 
mutual insurers tend to have a lower dividend payout ratio than stock insurers and the 
observed difference is about 4 percentage points, holding other factors constant; b) 
mutual insurers tend to adjust dividend payout ratios toward their long-run target levels 
more slowly than stock firms. These results are consistent with the capital constraints 
and/or greater agency costs of equity in mutual insurers.  
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G22 G32 G35 
 
Keywords: Dividend decisions; Property-liability insurance; Mutual and stock insurers; 
Capital structure; Capital constraints; Agency theory 
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1 Introduction 
 
Explaining dividend payout patterns has long been an interesting research issue in finance 
literature. This is because dividend policy not only represents an important signal about a 
firm’s future growth opportunities and profitability (e.g., see Lintner 1956; John and 
Williams 1985), but also concerns agency problems between stockholders and managers, 
stockholders and debtholders (e.g., see La Porta et al. 2000). Froot et al. (1993) further 
argue that dividend policy plays a direct role in coordinating firms’ financing and 
investment decisions. Some recent dividend studies (e.g., Dewenter and Warther 1998; 
La Porta et al. 2000; Short et al. 2002) have focused on how ownership and governance 
structures affect corporate dividend policies. 
In this study, we explore the effect of organizational forms on corporate dividend 
decisions – a topic not hitherto been investigated in the literature. Specifically, we 
compare the dividend payouts of mutual and stock property-liability (P-L) insurers in the 
United States (U.S.) (hereafter as “mutuals” and “stocks”, respectively). The U.S. 
insurance industry serves as an interesting setting within which to investigate dividend 
decisions of firms of different organizational forms, since a large number of stock firms 
(that are owned by stockholders) and mutual firms (that are owned by policyholders) 
coexist in this industry (Morse 2000). Mutuals differ from stocks in their ability to deal 
with agency problems and to raise external capital. Specifically, by merging the owner 
and policyholder functions, mutuals are efficient in mitigating the owner-policyholder 
incentive conflicts whereas stocks have advantages in controlling the owner-manager 
agency problems (Mayers and Smith 1981). Compared with stocks, mutuals have no 
access to stock markets and therefore have a weaker ability to raise capital (Cummins and 
Doherty 2002; Harrington and Niehaus 2002). As we will explain later, these two 
differences have implications for dividend policies of mutuals and stock firms. Focusing 
on a single industry in which all sample firms are subject to relatively homogenous 
growth opportunities also helps minimize the confounding effects of inter-industry 
heterogeneity on dividend decisions. 
  2
Insurance companies may pay dividends to both owners and policyholders. 
Therefore, in mutuals, dividends paid to owners are also dividends to policyholders. In 
contrast, owners (i.e., stockholders) and policyholders of stocks are separate parties. 
Stocks may issue participating policies to allow policyholders to share insurers’ profits 
via the payment of policyholder dividends, which to some extent help mitigate the 
incentive conflicts between stockholders and policyholders (e.g., see Garven and Pottier 
1995). However, Garven and Pottier (1995) report that the use of participating policies 
(and thereby the issue of policyholder dividends) is generally limited and less common 
for stock P-L insurers compared with stock life insurers. 
Several early studies have investigated the dividend decisions in the U.S. life 
insurance industry. For example, Formisano (1978) models the aggregate dividend 
payouts (i.e., including dividends to both stockholders and policyholders) of mutual and 
stock life insurers. His results suggest that dividend decisions of both mutual and stock 
life insurers tend to follow a “sticky” pattern that reflects their long-term operating results 
rather than annual fluctuations in earnings. Harrington (1981) examines the impact of 
group affiliation on stockholder dividend payouts of subsidiary stock life insurers and 
finds that life insurers significantly increase stockholder dividends after becoming 
affiliated with a group. He suggests that ownership structure and capital constraints are 
potentially important factors affecting insurers’ dividend decisions. Using a sample of 
U.S. mutual life insurers, Scordis and Pritchett (1998) show that dividend decisions of 
mutual life insurers are motivated by a desire to reduce the agency costs arising from 
managers’ discretionary use of free cash flow. However, with few exceptions (e.g., Lee 
and Forbes 1980; 1982), dividend decisions of P-L insurers have not been rigorously 
investigated, particularly from the perspective of organizational forms.1  
                                                 
1 Lee and Forbes (1980) examine some 30 U.S. P-L stock insurers and find that dividend payout ratios and share 
prices are closely related. Lee and Forbes (1982) show that the dividend payout ratios of 61 U.S. P-L stock 
insurers are affected by the previous payouts and ownership structure characterized by widely-held versus group-
affiliated insurers. Akhigbe et al. (1993) employ an event study methodology in testing the signaling effect of 
dividend changes. They observe a more significant market reaction to the dividend changes in P-L insurers than in 
life insurers. They ascribe such a difference in the market reaction to the volatile nature of property and liability 
business as opposed to the relatively stable life insurance business. 
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The significant differences between life and P-L insurance warrant a separate 
examination of the dividend decisions of P-L insurers (Lee and Forbes 1982; 
Krishnaswami and Pottier 2001). For example, compared with long-term and mortality 
table-based life insurance, P-L insurance is generally short-term, more volatile and less 
predictable (e.g., due to the occurrence of catastrophic losses) (Achleitner et al. 2002). 
Such differences imply that P-L insurers generally have more volatile underwriting 
capacity and are more likely to face capital constraints than life insurers. This feature 
makes capital structure and dividend decisions particularly important to the safe operation 
of P-L insurers (Lee and Forbes 1982). Cummins and Nini (2002) note that there have 
been significant increases in capital ratios in the U.S. P-L insurance industry since the 
1990s. Presumably, there are also significant changes in the dividend policies in the P-L 
insurance industry. Therefore, there is a need for an updated study of dividend decisions 
in the U.S. P-L insurance industry. 
Our study is also motivated by an attempt to fill a perceived gap in the growing 
body of literature on organizational differences between mutual and stock insurance 
companies. Prior studies have focused on examining the differences in ownership 
structure (e.g., Fields and Trtiroglu 1991; Mayers and Smith 1981), risk profiles (e.g., 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks 1993), and operational efficiency/financial performance (e.g., 
Armitage and Kirk 1994) of mutuals and stocks. However, potential differences in 
corporate financial decisions (e.g., capital structure and dividend payouts) have generally 
been neglected. A recent study by Harrington and Niehaus (2002) compares the capital 
structures of mutual and stock P-L insurers. They contend that, as mutual P-L insurers 
generally face more capital constraints (e.g., due to the limited access to capital markets 
and thereby a high cost of raising external capital), they should have higher target capital 
ratios and should adjust toward their targets more slowly than stock P-L insurers. Their 
findings provide support for these predictions. Anecdotal evidence suggests the 
importance of dividend policies in the financing decisions of P-L insurers. Lee and 
Forbes (1982, p. 277) contend that the adjustment of dividends is the most convenient 
way for P-L insurers to adjust toward their target level of capital. In another study, 
Cummins and Danzon (1997) report that the amount of external equity capital raised by 
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P-L insurers is negatively related to retained earnings, suggesting that P-L insurers 
consider dividend payouts and retained earnings first before resorting to external 
financing. Given the close link between P-L insurers’ dividend and capital structure 
decisions, our study thus adds to the very limited literature on the differences in the 
financial decisions of different types of insurers (Harrington and Niehaus 2002, p. 160).  
Our primary purpose is to investigate the difference in dividend payout ratios 
between mutuals and stocks. In explaining the possible difference, two strands of 
theoretical arguments – the capital-constraint hypothesis and the agency-based arguments 
– are germane. The capital-constraint hypothesis argues that since mutuals have no access 
to stock markets and face greater capital constraints, they are likely to pay a lower rate of 
dividends than stocks in order to hoard capital, other things being equal.  
In contrast, agency theory does not have a clear prediction about the difference in 
dividend payouts between mutuals and stocks. On one hand, mutuals’ advantages in 
controlling owner-policyholder conflicts result in reduced marginal benefit from holding 
capital in mutuals (Cummins and Nini 2002). This implies that unlike stocks that need to 
keep an adequate level of capital in order to attract and assure policyholders, mutuals can 
afford to pay more dividends. On the other hand, mutuals’ disadvantages in mitigating 
owner-manager incentive conflicts imply that mutual managers have more opportunities 
to divert free cash flow to perquisite consumption and so the agency costs of equity in 
mutuals are likely to be higher than in stocks, other things being equal. Scordis and 
Pritchett (1998) argue, and find support for the argument (using a sample of mutual life 
insurers), that in order to relieve the concerns of policyholders, managers of mutuals may 
practice a more liberal dividend payout policy than stocks. While this is possible, many 
prior studies (e.g., Wells et al. 1995) also report that the poor control mechanisms present 
in mutuals (e.g., the lack of market for corporate control and stock options as managerial 
incentive compensation) often result in little pressure being exerted on managers to 
distribute profits.  
Second, we also examine the difference in the speed of adjustment toward their 
target dividend payout ratios between mutual and stock insurers. Because of the lack of 
stock market pressure and greater capital constraints, mutuals are likely to adjust their 
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dividend payout ratios toward the long-run target levels more slowly than stocks, other 
things being equal. This means that the dividend payouts of mutuals may deviate from 
their long-run targets more frequently than stock firms.  
Our results from a large sample of unaffiliated U.S. P-L insurers suggest that 
mutuals’ dividend payout ratio is on average about 4 percentage points lower than the 
total dividend payout ratio of stock insurers. In addition, both stock and mutual insurers’ 
dividend payouts appear to be “sticky”, however, mutuals tend to adjust toward their 
target dividend payout ratios more slowly than do stock insurers. These results, robust to 
different proxies of dividend payouts, are consistent with the capital constraints and/or 
greater agency costs of equity in mutual insurers.  
One contribution of the current study to the dividend literature is that we show 
that different organizational forms (mutuals versus stocks) can help shape different 
corporate dividend policies. Our study also provides an extension to prior studies 
investigating the differences between mutuals and stocks. For example, our results can 
help explain the observed higher target capital ratios in mutual insurers reported in 
Harrginton and Niehaus (2002).  
 The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the role of 
dividend policies in P-L insurers’ financing decisions and develops our hypotheses. In 
Section 3 we motivate some key determinants of dividend payouts. Section 4 describes 
our data and methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical findings and Section 6 
concludes the article.   
 
2 Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1 The Role of Dividend Decisions in P-L Insurers’ Financing Decisions 
Earnings retention and dividend policy are likely to play an important role in P-L 
insurers’ financing decisions. First, because there is significant information asymmetry 
between company managers and outside investors about the quality of the company, 
external financing is costly (e.g., see Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984). The P-L 
insurance industry tends to have a volatile operating performance and is prone to 
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catastrophic events. Therefore, P-L insurance managers are likely to have private 
knowledge of their exposures, future claims and the adequacy of loss reserves that is not 
easily possessed by external investors and policyholders (Chamberlain and Tennyson 
1998; Cummins and Doherty 2002). Akhigbe et al. (1993) also note that information 
asymmetry between insurance firms and their investors or policyholders can be 
aggravated by insurers’ flexibility in booking underwriting profits and setting loss 
reserves, which potentially reduces the reliability of insurers’ financial statements.2 The 
problem of information asymmetry is even more severe for mutual insurers and thinly 
traded stock insurers (Chamberlain and Tennyson 1998). Therefore, external equity is 
more costly than retained earnings and insurance companies have a preference for 
internally generated capital (Gron 1994).  
Second, Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) report that the regulation of capital 
ratios in the P-L insurance industry limits insurers’ use of risky debt that may have a 
lower cost than external equity. Harrington and Niehaus (2002) also note that current 
regulations require a prior approval of interest/principal payments and the use of surplus 
notes. 3  This means insurers (particularly mutuals) may have limited access to debt 
financing. 
Indeed, consistent with the above view that earnings retention (e.g., via practicing 
a conservative dividend policy) is important on the financing pecking order of P-L 
insurers, Lee and Forbes (1982) report that during 1950s – 1970s, issuing new equities 
was not an important source of incremental capital in stock P-L insurance companies. 
Cummins and Nini (2002) note that the contribution to capital growth by retained 
                                                 
2 Akhigbe et al. (1993) argue that because the financial statements of insurers are not a reliable signaling 
mechanism, investors may have to rely heavily on other signals (e.g., changes in dividend policy). This 
forces many firms to minimize unnecessary changes in the dividend policy in order to avoid undesirable 
market consequences. Akhigbe et al. (1993) therefore argue that adjusting insurers’ dividends may create 
an effective signal and they document a positive and significant market reaction to a sample of listed 
insurers’ announcements of dividend increases. 
3 Insurers may also increase liabilities by taking on more businesses. However, regulation requires that the 
amount of insurance premiums that an insurer can write is up to certain times of its capital. For example, 
the famous Kenney rule argues that the ratio of premiums to capital for a P-L insurer should not exceed 2. 
In recent years, there is a declining trend in Kenney ratio in the U.S. P-L industry probably reflecting that 
insurers leave more financial slack for catastrophes (Cummins and Doherty 2002). Indeed, Smith (2001) 
reports that over the period 1994-1999, the industry average for U.S. P-L insurers was in the range of 0.84-
1.3. 
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earnings was more than twice the amount of capital raised from external sources in the 
U.S. P-L industry in the 1990s.4   
 
2.2 Dividend Payouts: Mutuals vs. Stocks 
In the following, we discuss the implications of the capital-constraint hypothesis and the 
agency-based arguments for the dividend payouts of mutuals and stock insurers. 
The capital-constraint hypothesis states that since mutuals have no access to stock 
markets, they have a weaker ability to raise external capital and thereby are subject to 
more capital constraints than stocks (Cummins and Doherty 2002; Harrington and 
Niehaus 2002; Mayers and Smith 2002). Mutuals integrate owners with policyholders; 
however, the contributions of policyholders (in the form of insurance premiums) are 
treated as liabilities rather than equity before they are earned on accrual basis in both 
mutual and stock insurers. Because mutuals have no access to stock markets, they have to 
rely on retained earnings to build up their equity. Consequently, compared with stocks, 
mutuals should find it more difficult and costly to raise capital (particularly after a major 
underwriting loss). Analyzing 98 cases of demutualization, Mayers and Smith (2002) 
report that many mutuals typically experienced a high sales growth rate and low equity in 
the years prior to conversion. This suggests that relaxing binding capital constraints and 
thereby reducing opportunity costs associated with forgone investments is one of the 
important motivations for demutualization. Harrington and Niehaus (2002) find that, on 
average, mutual P-L insurers’ capital to liabilities ratio is about 10% higher than that of 
stock P-L insurers. Therefore, the capital-constraint hypothesis implies that, other things 
being equal, mutuals should have a lower dividend payout ratio than stocks.  
Two kinds of agency-based arguments are relevant to the dividend payouts of 
mutuals and stocks. First, mutuals have advantages over stocks in controlling owner-
policyholder incentive conflicts. Cummins and Nini (2002) argue that the elimination of 
                                                 
4 When capital is inadequate relative to liabilities, P-L insurers can also choose to scale down their liability 
side (i.e., taking on less business) in addition to raising capital externally. However, this is an inflexible and 
potentially costly solution given its adverse impacts on customers (e.g., see Lee and Forbes 1982).  
Harrington and Niehaus (2002) also contend that there is no reason to expect the costs associated with 
adjusting the liability side to vary between mutual and stock P-L insurers. 
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owner-policyholder incentive conflicts could result in reduced marginal benefit from 
holding capital in mutuals. This implies that unlike stocks that need to keep an adequate 
level of capital in order to attract and assure policyholders, mutuals can afford to pay 
more dividends.5 
Second, compared with stocks, mutuals are poorer in controlling owner-manager 
incentive conflicts because they cannot utilize share ownership and/or stock options to 
motivate managers and there is not a market for corporate control that can exert pressure 
on managers (Mayers and Smith 1981). In addition, the highly disparate policyholder-
ownership groups in mutuals face greater difficulties in effectively monitoring 
managerial activities (Morse 2000). Therefore, mutual managers have more opportunities 
to pursue personal interests by diverting free cash flow into perquisite consumption than 
their stock counterparts (Mayers and Smith 1981). In principle, rational policyholders 
may choose to surrender their policies if they think such owner-manager agency costs 
outweigh the benefits of mitigated owner-policyholder incentive conflicts.  Recognizing 
this, managers of mutual insurers may voluntarily issue (policyholder) dividends and 
thereby reduce the free cash flow at their disposal. Consistent with this view, Scordis and 
Pritchett (1998) find that mutual life insurers with a larger free cash flow choose to pay 
more dividends in order to reduce the agency costs arising from managers’ discretionary 
use of free cash flow. Myers and Pritchett (1983) document that policyholders tend to 
realize higher long-run returns (in the form of dividends received) from purchasing 
participating (life) insurance policies from mutuals than buying non-participating 
insurance policies and invest the savings in premiums from stock insurers. On the other 
hand, there is ample evidence suggesting that policyholders’ monitoring of managers in 
mutual insurers is often ineffective.6 For example, Wells et al. (1995) report that mutual 
life insurers have a larger free cash flow than stock life insurers, other things being equal. 
This suggests that managers in mutual insurers could choose to pay less dividends than in 
stock insurers so that they have more free cash flow at their disposal. 
                                                 
5 However, insurance regulation may help alleviate policyholders’ concern about the potential opportunistic 
behaviors of stock insurers’ managers and stockholders. 
6 See Wells et al. (1995) for a review of the relevant evidence. 
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Therefore, agency theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction regarding 
the difference in dividend payouts between mutuals and stocks. Also, it is important to 
note that the capital-constraint hypothesis and the agency-based arguments are not non-
mutually exclusive. As such, we do not make an ex-ante prediction on the possible 
difference in dividend payouts but leave it to be answered by the empirical investigation.   
 
 
3 Variables 
 
3.1 Main Variables 
In order to test whether mutuals have a lower dividend payout ratio than stocks, we 
regress two dividend payout ratios on an organizational form dummy (MUTUAL, 1 for 
mutuals and 0 for stocks), while controlling for other relevant factors (see Section 3.2). 
As in Johnson (1995) and La Porta et al. (2000), both dividend payout ratios (DIV1/2) are 
measured by the actual amount of dividends scaled by the net earnings before dividends.7 
Our primary dividend payout proxy DIV1 is computed by using total dividends, i.e., 
aggregating dividends to both stockholders and policyholders in stock insurers. This 
aggregation approach is also adopted in Formisano (1978) and Lee and Forbes (1982). 
Notably, Lee and Forbes (1982, p.285) conclude that P-L stock insurers seem to make 
their earnings payout decisions on the basis of total policyholder and stockholder 
dividends rather than considering these dividends separately. On the other hand, Garven 
and Pottier (1995) note that the use of participating policies (and thereby the issue of 
policyholder dividends) is generally limited for P-L stock insurers compared with stock 
life insurers. Therefore, we only use dividends to owners in computing DIV2 as an 
alternative proxy for dividend payout ratio. Our results are robust to both proxies. 
 
3.2 Other Determinants of Dividend Payouts as Control Variables 
We control for several factors that may have important influences on insurers’ 
dividend decisions and their motivations are briefly explained as follows.  
                                                 
7 Other proxies like dividends per share are not available for mutuals. 
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Prior Dividend Payouts. Prior studies on industrial firms (e.g., Lintner 1956) and 
insurers (e.g., Formisano 1978; Lee and Forbes 1982) suggest that dividend payout ratios 
tend to be “sticky”, i.e., companies tend to have a long-run target dividend payout ratio 
and the adjustment to the target may not be completed in one period. We include the one-
period lag of dividend payout ratios (LAGDIV1/2) in the dividend payout model. A 
positive and statistically significant estimate on the coefficient of this variable for 
mutuals and stock companies would be consistent with the view that the dividend payouts 
of P-L insurers tend to follow a “sticky” pattern and have a long-run target ratio. The 
coefficient on the one-period lag of the dividend payout ratios also can be interpreted 
under a partial adjustment framework where the adjustment of dividend payout ratios to 
long-run target levels may not be completed in one accounting period. This partial 
adjustment model has been extensively used in prior studies (e.g., Cummins and Sommer 
1996; Harrington and Niehaus 2002). Specifically, the speed of partial adjustment is 
equal to (1 – the estimated coefficient of LAGDIV1/2).  
Firm Size. Firm size (SIZE) (measured by the logarithm of total admitted assets at 
the beginning of the period8) is included to control for differences in growth opportunities 
and the ability to raise capital among firms of different sizes. Large firms are normally 
mature organizations with less growth opportunities (Linter 1956). Additionally, large 
firms often face less information asymmetry between managers and investors (e.g., 
because of more analyst followings) and hence it is less expensive for them to raise 
capital than small companies (e.g., Smith 1977). Such reasoning thus suggests that large 
insurers are likely to have a higher dividend payout ratio than small insurers.  
Leverage. A highly levered insurer may find it more difficult and costly to raise 
additional (debt and/or equity) capital than an insurer with low leverage given the fomer’s 
expected higher possibility of insolvency (Jensen et al. 1992). As a result, insurers with 
high leverage may have to rely more on internal financing and thereby result in a lower 
dividend payout ratio. However, the linkage between leverage and dividends can run the 
other way – for example, a low dividend payout will lower the debt to equity ratio 
                                                 
8 The beginning-of-period total assets figure is used to mitigate the possible endogeneity between the 
dividend payouts and contemporaneous total assets. 
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(Johnson 1995). In order to control for the influence of leverage over dividend decisions, 
we use a measure of before-dividend leverage (LEV) (measured as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets in the year beginning) in the analysis and predict a negative sign 
on its coefficient. 
Growth Opportunities. Lintner (1956) and Froot et al. (1993) suggest that firms 
facing more growth opportunities need more capital for investment in positive net present 
value projects (e.g., an attractive takeover) and hence are less likely to pay a high level of 
dividends than other firms. Myers and Majluf (1984) contend that a firm with more 
growth opportunities may find it more costly to raise external capital than a firm with 
limited growth opportunities, as the former typically faces more information asymmetry 
about the quality of new projects between outside investors and managers than the latter. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relation between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
dividend payout ratio. As in Colquitt, Sommer and Godwin (1999), accounting–based 
annual growth rate in net premium written is used to measure a firm’s growth 
opportunities (GROW). This is because there are no market-based growth proxies for 
mutual companies. However, it is important to note that such a measure can be noisy 
given its ex-post nature (Pilotte 1992). Additionally, a firm’s growth opportunities can be 
partly captured by its size and profitability. For example, large and established firms are 
often mature entities with less growth opportunities (Lintner 1956); in contrast, currently 
profitable firms are likely to have more future growth opportunities than loss-making 
firms (Hardwick and Adams 2002). 
Profitability. Insurers’ dividend decisions are also likely to be affected by 
profitability. A highly profitable company is likely to issue more dividends than a less 
profitable company, all else equal. Following Hardwick and Adams (2002), we control 
for the effects of both the current and past profitability (i.e., PROF and LAGPROF). As in 
Todd and McEnally (1974), PROF is measured by net income before dividends and tax in 
year t divided by total assets of year t-1 (similar to “return on assets”).  
Free Cash Flow. In Section 2.2, we discussed the implications of differences in 
agency costs between stocks and mutuals. However, agency costs associated with free 
cash flow may also vary from firm to firm of the same organizational form (Scordis and 
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Pritchett 1998). A firm with a large free cash flow faces greater agency costs between 
managers and owners, which can be lowered by paying more dividends. On the other 
hand, free cash flow may simply serve as a pool of internal capital, as a result, a firm with 
a large free cash flow may afford to pay more dividends.9 We therefore explicitly include 
a measure of free cash flow in order to control for these possibilities and predict it has a 
positive effect on dividend payouts.10 Previous studies (e.g., Scordis and Pritchett 1998) 
use an after-dividend measure of free cash flow (FCF) (i.e., pre-tax operating and 
investment income + new capital paid in – income taxes - dividends). In the current 
study, we use a before-dividend measure of free cash flow by adding back dividends 
(scaled by total assets). This is important as using an after-dividend measure to examine 
the dividend decision may induce a contaminating effect on the relation between the 
dividend payouts and free cash flow.  
Earnings Volatility. Insurers with a more volatile earnings stream are likely to 
use more retained earnings as capital in order to absorb any future higher-than-expected 
underwriting losses and/or investment shocks. It is also favorable for such insurers to 
maintain a conservative dividend payout in the first place, as such prudence can help 
lower the chance that they may be forced to lower dividend payouts subsequently in the 
event of unfavorable operating experiences and/or new investment needs. This is 
necessary because the changes in dividend payouts may be perceived by the market as 
important signals and may induce strong reactions (e.g., see Akhigbe et al. 1993). 
Following Bradley et al. (1984) and Scordis and Pritchett (1998), earnings volatility 
(EARISK) is measured by the standard deviation of the first difference in net earnings 
before dividends over the previous five years scaled by the average book value of total 
assets in the same period. For example, the earnings volatility of 1994 is calculated using 
                                                 
9 Because of this, free cash flow is at most a noisy proxy for testing the owner-manager incentive conflict 
argument in relation to dividend payouts and managerial perquisite consumption. 
10 Stock insurers may face another type of agency costs in relation to excessive free cash flow – the costs 
arising from the incentive conflicts between stockholders and policyholders. Krishnaswami and Pottier 
(2001) argue that stock life insurers can mitigate the stockholder-policyholder conflicts by issuing more 
participating policies, where policyholders have the right to share insurers’ residual claims. The implication 
is that stock P-L insurers can also increase policyholder dividends (e.g., by issuing more new participating 
policies and/or increasing the dividend payouts of existing participating policies) to reduce such agency 
costs in relation to free cash flow. Therefore, for both mutual and stock insurers, a large aggregate dividend 
payout can be used to reduce agency costs associated with excessive free cash flow.  
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the earnings of 1989-1993. Bradley et al. (1984) report that this version of earnings 
volatility is superior to other measures – for example, a simple standard deviation of 
annual net earnings.  
By-line business income. Given that underwriting risk varies according to 
different business lines, we also include by-line business income as additional control 
variables on the effect of business risk on dividend policy. We follow the prior literature 
(e.g., Barrese et al. 1995; Regan and Tzeng 1999) and divide P-L insurance businesses 
into personal auto physical damage and liability insurance (AUTO), homeowners 
insurance (HOMEOWN), fire (FIRE), commercial multiperils (COMPER), inland marine 
(INLANDM), ocean marine (OCEAN), allied lines (ALLIED) and workers’ compensation 
(WORKER). The rest of lines are categorized as “others” and this category is omitted 
from the regression model to avoid collinearity. We provide no ex-ante prediction on the 
direction of the impact of each by-line business income variable on dividend payouts. 
 
4 Data and Methodology 
 
4.1 Data  
We start our sample construction with all P-L insurers filing annual regulatory statements 
with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for the period 1994 to 
2000, which represents the longest period for which data were available to us when the 
study was carried out. Limiting our sample to this period also enables us to have a more 
robust test of the possible difference in dividend payouts between mutual and stock 
insurers because of two reasons. First, starting from 1994 is necessary as in 1994, the 
risk-based capital (RBC) system was implemented and it may cause structural changes in 
insurers’ capital and dividend decisions. 11  Second, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 caused U.S. insurers to pay billions of dollars in damages and may confound the 
comparison of dividend payout policies before and after 2001. We do not investigate the 
                                                 
11 In our analysis, only one variable needs figures on total assets and net earnings going back to 1989 (i.e., 
the volatility of earnings for 1994); however, we believe this should not be a serious concern as insurers’ 
total assets and earnings are unlikely to be greatly affected by the introduction of the RBC system.  
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impacts of this catastrophic loss event on insurers’ dividend payout policies in the current 
study, but leave it as an interesting topic for future research. 
One potential difficulty with comparing the dividend payout of mutual and stock 
insurers is that the result can be confounded by the group status of insurers. Dividend 
decisions of firms belonging to groups tend to be more complicated than unaffiliated 
firms.  For example, affiliated insurers are exposed to less capital constraints because of 
the possible funding help from their parent company when needed (Harrington 1981). 
Lee and Forbes (1982) further note that an affiliated insurer’s dividend decision might be 
dictated by its parent company and the parent company may wish to declare dividends in 
order to reduce the perceived excess surplus in the subsidiary. However, the NAIC data 
do not differentiate dividends paid to intra-group firms (and the direction of the payment) 
from dividends paid to outside investors. As such, we cannot conduct our analysis on the 
group basis. In the current study, we limit our sample to unaffiliated mutual and stock 
insurers in order to have a cleaner test of our hypotheses.12 A similar approach is also 
taken in Mayers and Smith (1990) where they examine the determinants of the 
reinsurance use by P-L insurers. We also require a sample firm to be either a stock or a 
mutual firm throughout the sample period in order to avoid confounding effects of 
organizational changes on dividend payouts.13 Reciprocals and Lloyds Syndicates are 
excluded as they are deemed to be outside the scope of the current study. Our selection 
criteria resulted in an unbalanced sample of 2,976 firms/years, representing 490 firms. Of 
which, 1,414 observations are for mutual firms and 1,562 observations are for stock 
insurers. The unbalanced sample arises as we allow firms to enter or exit our sample (e.g., 
because of mergers and acquisitions and/or business failures) in order to avoid the 
survivorship bias and have a robust test of our hypotheses. 
 
4.2 Model 
                                                 
12 In an early version of the current paper, we use 9,142 firms/years that include both unaffiliated and 
group-affiliated P-L insurers as our sample and we include a group status as a control variable in our 
model, we obtained similar results to the results from using unaffiliated insurers. 
13 The effect of organizational form conversions on dividend payouts is an interesting topic for future study. 
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Given that dividend payout ratios are censored at zero, we adopt a Tobit 
regression model to examine whether there is a difference in the dividend payouts 
between mutuals and stocks, while controlling for other relevant factors. Dividend payout 
ratios become negative if a firm incurred a loss in the current year. This creates a 
discontinuity in the measures since the loss-making firm pays out cash but has a payout 
ratio less than that of a firm paying no dividends. To avoid such a bias, as in Johnson 
(1995), observations with negative dividend payout ratios are excluded; this treatment 
leaves out 107 observations. Specifically, the basic model to be estimated is as follows:  
DIV1/2 = f (MUTUAL, Control variables ) + v [1] 
  Where, v ∼ N(0, σ2). All the other variables are defined in Sections 2 and 3.   
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables by organizational forms. 
Comparing means and medians, DIV1/2 and LAGDIV1/2 tend to be influenced by some 
high values. To avoid the undesirable influences by extreme values, we trim DIV1/2 and 
LAGDIV1/2 at their 99th percentile in the following correlation and regression analyses. 
Table 1 also shows that in our sample, about 37.5% of stock insurers issued dividends as 
opposed to 11.5% for mutual firms paying dividends. Therefore, stock firms in the 
sample appear to issue dividends more frequently than do mutuals. Also, the mean 
dividend payout ratio is about 5.5% for mutuals as opposed to over 35% for stocks. These 
results are consistent with the view that mutual firms need to retain more earnings as 
capital due to their greater capital constraints than stock insurers and/or because the 
agency costs of equity in mutual insurers are higher than in stock insurers.  
Table 1 also provides an opportunity to evaluate some existing arguments 
regarding the differences in operating characteristics between mutual and stock insurers. 
The risk-profile hypothesis (e.g., see Lamm-Tennant and Starks 1993; Morse 2000), 
which predicts that mutual insurers are less risky than stock insurers, is supported by 
comparing the mean/median of LEV and EARISK between mutuals and stocks. In contrast 
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to the finding of Wells et al. (1995) that document a larger (absolute amount of) free cash 
flow in mutual life insurers than stock life insurers, stock P-L insurers in our sample 
appear to have a higher free-cash-flow to assets ratio than mutuals. Additionally, 
consistent with the findings of Harrington and Niehaus (2002), stock P-L insurers tend to 
be larger and more profitable than their mutual counterparts. The lower leverage ratio in 
mutuals in our sample is also consistent with the reported higher capital ratio in mutuals 
by Harrington and Niehaus (2002), which may be a result of a lower dividend payout 
ratio in mutuals than stocks.  
The managerial discretion hypothesis advanced by Mayers and Smith (1981) 
states that to compensate for the limited control that mutuals exercise over management, 
mutuals will tend to operate in business lines that involve limited managerial discretion 
(e.g., auto, fire and homeowner insurance); while stock firms should concentrate more on 
lines (e.g., workers compensation, marine insurance and commercial multi-perils) that 
require more managerial discretion. These arguments obtain some support from our 
sample data, but it is not immediately clear why mutuals wrote more commercial 
insurance than stock insurers. Moreover, no significant difference in the growth rate of 
net premiums written is found between mutuals and stocks.  
Garven and Pottier (1995) note that the use of participating policies (and thereby 
the issue of policyholder dividends) is generally limited for P-L stock insurers. This view 
is also confirmed by our data. For example, (according to unreported statistics,) the mean 
stockholder dividend payout is 12.43 million dollars per stock firm/year, whereas that of 
policyholder dividends is only 1.48 million dollars per stock firm/year. Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the mean of DIV1 and DIV2 are quite close. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. Because 
there are some very large values in the dividend payout ratios, the results are based on a 
sample after trimming observations at the 99th percentiles of dividend payout ratios. 
Table 2 reveals a negative and statistically significant association between dividend 
payout ratios (DIV1 and DIV2) and MUTUAL, implying that mutual firms have a lower 
dividend payout ratio than stocks. As expected, dividend payout ratios are found to be 
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positively correlated with LAGDIV, SIZE, PROF, LAGPROF and FCF, but negatively 
related to EARISK. This suggests that dividend payout ratios in the U.S. P-L insurers are 
“sticky”. In addition, large, profitable insurers and/or firms with a large free cash flow 
appear to issue more dividends than others; in contrast, insurers with greater earnings risk 
tend to be more cautious in issuing dividends than others. Also note that our two proxies 
of dividend payouts are highly correlated (0.91). This confirms that the policyholder 
dividends paid by stock insurers are limited. 
The correlation coefficients between the independent variables are generally 
moderate (up to 0.53). We also compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each 
independent variable that appears in the regression models; the calculated VIFs are all 
less than 2. Therefore, there is no evidence of multicollinearity.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.2 Multivariate Results 
5.2.1 Dividend Payout Ratios: Mutuals vs. Stocks 
We estimate both pooled and year-by-year Tobit models to test our hypotheses.14 
We also include year dummies in the pooled analysis in order to control for time-varying 
factors that are common to all insurance firms (e.g., insurance underwriting cycles). We 
report standard errors clustered at firm level that are robust to unknown hetroskedasticity 
and within-firm serial correlation in the pooled analysis given that our sample is a panel 
data set (see Greene 1999). 
We trim the sample at the 99th percentile of the two dividend payout ratios (and 
their lags) (about 1.83 and 1.84, respectively) in order to help readers better evaluate the 
sensitivity of our results.15 This treatment leaves out 56 and 48 observations in the two 
models reported, respectively. 
                                                 
14 A Tobit model with fixed-effects cannot be used because of the multicollinearity between the key 
variable of interest - MUTUAL and fixed-effects. We also tried a Tobit model with random-effects; 
however it could not converge due to the insufficient intra-company variations in firm-specific error terms. 
This suggests that a Tobit model with random-effects is not appropriate for our data as the assumption of 
treating firm-specific error terms as random does not seem to be met (see Greene 1999).  
15 Including these observations generally produced similar results except that in some years, the coefficients 
on MUTUAL* LAGDIV in Table 4 can be over 1 (see Section 5.2.2). 
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 [Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 reports the results from using DIV1. The coefficient of MUTUAL is found 
to be consistently negative and statistically significant (except in year 2000), suggesting 
that after controlling for other factors, mutual companies have a lower dividend payout 
ratio than stock companies. The coefficient of MUTUAL ranges from -0.015 to -0.042, 
suggesting that mutuals tend to pay a dividend payout ratio about 2~4 percentage points 
lower than stock firms, holding other factors constant. If using the results from the pooled 
analysis, the difference is about 4 percentage points. These results reflect the capital 
constraints and/or the greater agency costs of equity in mutuals.  
Additionally, the coefficient of LAGDIV1 is positive and statistically significant in 
all the models, thus confirming the “stickiness” of dividend payouts in P-L insurers. On 
the results of the other control variables, it appears that as expected, larger firms, firms 
with a lower earnings volatility and/or higher prior profitability generally have a higher 
dividend payout ratio than other firms. The results from the pooled analysis on LEV, 
PROF and FCF are consistent with our expectations - that is, insurers with lower 
leverage, being more profitable, and/or have a larger before-dividend free cash flow tend 
to have a higher dividend payout ratio. The results of these variables are, however, mixed 
in the year-by-year analysis. Finally, while the impact of growth opportunities (GROW) 
on dividend payouts is generally negative, it is only significant in some years. It is 
plausible that annual growth in net premiums written is a “noisy” proxy given its ex-post 
nature (Pilotte 1992). Alternatively, as explained in Section 3.2, a firm’s growth 
opportunities may have been partially captured by its size and profitability.  
On the effect of by-line business income variables on dividend payouts, it seems 
that insurers with more premium income derived from homeowner and fire insurance 
tend to have a lower dividend payout ratio. However, there is not a reliable and evident 
pattern on the effect of other business income variables on dividend payouts, which may 
reflect the stochastic nature of P-L insurance businesses. 
 
5.2.2 Partial Adjustment Speed of Dividend Payouts: Mutuals vs. Stocks  
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Since we find that the dividend payouts of both mutuals and stocks tend to be 
“sticky”, it would be interesting to explore the potential difference in the speed of 
adjustment to their long-run target dividend payout ratios between mutuals and stocks. 
Examining this issue is also necessary as Harrington and Niehaus (2002) show that the 
capital level of mutual insurers tends to rely more on income and therefore the capital 
ratio adjusts more slowly to long-run targets than do stocks. We expect mutual firms to 
adjust toward their long-run target dividend payout ratios more slowly than do stock 
insurers for the following reasons.  
First, the dividend policy of many stock insurers is to maintain a steady growth of 
dividends that constitute an important part of the total return to investors. The pressure to 
achieve this aim is particularly high when a stock insurer is publicly listed. Akhige et al. 
(1993) show that stock prices of listed insurers are sensitive to dividend changes. 
Therefore, when dividend payout ratios deviate from their long-run target levels, stock 
insurers should have strong incentives to quickly restore them to their long-run target 
levels in order to avoid undesirable adverse market reaction (that can be induced by 
frequently subsequent changes in dividend payout ratios). In case of favorable financial 
performance, stocks should have incentives to reflect such performance in their dividend 
payouts (though the magnitude of the increment in dividend payouts might be modest). 
The benefit of doing so is that it can help boost the confidence of both existing and 
prospective investors. Indeed, because of their better access to equity and debt markets, 
stocks should be more capable of making dividend adjustment to target payout ratios than 
mutuals. 
By contrast, limited by their weak ability to raise external capital, mutuals are 
likely to have enhanced incentives to retain earnings as capital in good times in 
anticipation of future capital shocks. This suggests that the dividend payouts of mutuals 
should be less reflective of their favorable financial performance than those of stocks. 
Indeed, at least historically, mutuals are formed by policyholders whose primary 
objective is to ensure secure and adequate insurance coverage rather than to maximize 
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investment returns (Morse 2000).16 The lower market pressure (e.g., due to the lack of 
market-traded company stocks) facing mutual insurance managers may further decrease 
their incentives to adjust dividend payouts back to the long-run target levels in a timely 
manner in the event of an unexpected deviation. Therefore, we hypothesize that mutual 
insurers are likely to adjust their dividend payouts toward long-run targets more slowly 
than stocks, other things being equal.  
As a demonstration, suppose the current dividend payout ratio of a mutual P-L 
insurer is below its long-run target level. After a favorable operational experience, the 
mutual insurer may be reluctant to significantly increase its dividend payout ratio due to 
its need to retain more earnings as capital in good times. Therefore, the deviation is 
expected to persist for some time. In case of an unfavorable operational experience, the 
mutual insurer may be unlikely to increase its dividend payout ratio due to financial 
constraints and so the deviation will continue.17  
In order to test whether a mutual P-L insurer is likely to adjust the dividend 
payout ratio toward its long-run target level more slowly than a P-L stock insurer, we 
include an interaction term MUTUAL×LAGDIV to capture the potential differences in the 
partial adjustment speed of dividend payout ratios between mutuals and stocks. Since the 
partial adjustment speed is equal to (1 – the estimated coefficient of LAGDIV), we expect 
MUTUAL×LAGDIV to have a positive sign. The regression results are reported in Table 
4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient on MUTUAL×LAGDIV is positive 
and statistically significant in all models. More specifically, the partial adjustment speed 
for stock firms is between 0.841 (= 1 – 0.159, in year 1996) and 0.922 (= 1– 0.078, in 
                                                 
16 Myers and Pritchett (1983) argue that in addition to being a way of refunding premium overcharges, 
dividends issued by mutual insurers also include a profit sharing element. 
17 One may argue that if the current dividend payout ratio is over its long-run target level, a mutual P-L 
insurer may have incentives to quickly lower its dividend payout ratio to the target level. If this happens, 
mutual P-L insurers may at least have an equally quick speed of adjustment to their long-run target levels as 
stock P-L insurers. While this is possible, it is unlikely for mutual insurers to frequently pay dividends 
higher than their long-run target levels due to their greater capital constraints and higher financing costs. 
Overall, the effect of the slow adjustment that arises when mutual insurers have a lower-than-target 
dividend payout ratio is likely to dominate. 
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year 1999); the adjustment speed for mutuals is in the range of 0.727 (= 1 – 0.104 – 0.169, 
in year 2000) to 0.854 (= 1 – 0.085 – 0.061, in year 1994). While such a difference is 
statistically significant, it seems that both stock and mutual insurers normally only take a 
relatively short time period (less than 2 years) to complete the adjustment toward their 
target ratios. There are no major changes in the results of other variables except that the 
relation between HOMEOWN and dividend payouts becomes weaker after controlling for 
MUTUAL×LAGDIV. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks  
We perform several tests as robustness checks of our findings. 
 First, we include an interaction term MUTUAL×FCF in the models of Table 3 
and 4 in order to see whether the relation between free cash flow and dividend payouts 
varies between stock and mutual firms. However, in unreported results, the coefficient of 
this interaction term is never significant, with the results on FCF and other variables 
unaffected. Therefore, we do not find evidence that the relation between free cash flow 
and dividend payouts varies between stock and mutual firms. As the coefficient of FCF 
(a noisy proxy for testing the owner-manager incentive conflicts) is only positive and 
significant in 3 out of the 8 regressions in Tables 3 & 4 and in 1 out of 8 models in Table 
5, we cannot rule out the possibility that the lower dividend payout ratio observed in 
mutuals may be due to their acuter owner-manager agency problems. Indeed, this 
possibility is also recognized in Harrington and Niehaus (2002, p.148) when they find 
that mutuals tend to have a higher capital level than stock firms. 
Second, as another way to deal with extreme values in dividend payouts, we trim 
the sample by excluding observations with dividend payout ratios (and their lags) over 1 
from the analysis. This ends up with a sample with 2,744 and 2,768 observations, 
respectively. A repeated analysis corresponding to Table 3 and 4 generates similar results 
and so they are not reported for brevity. 
Third, we use an alternative measure of dividend payouts DIV2  that is computed 
using only dividends to owners. The results reported in Table 5 are largely comparable to 
the results from using DIV1. Therefore, our finding on the higher dividend payout ratio in 
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stock firms is not driven by the inclusion of policyholder dividends in DIV1 in stock 
insurers. 
Finally, in an early version of the paper, we include both group affiliated and 
unaffiliated insurers and a group affiliation dummy in the analysis. Using the sample of 
9,142 observations, we find similar results.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Mutual and stock forms of organization are the two predominant corporate forms in the 
U.S. P-L insurance industry and there is a growing body of literature investigating the 
differences in firm characteristics between mutual and stock insurers. In particular, 
Harrington and Niehaus (2002) find that mutual P-L insurers tend to have a higher target 
capital ratio and appear to adjust toward their target capital ratio more slowly than stock 
P-L insurers. Our study extends this literature by comparing the dividend payouts of 
mutual and stock P-L insurers. Our study also fits in the literature on the impact of 
ownership structure on corporate dividend policies. 
There are two non-mutually exclusive theoretical arguments that could explain the 
dividend payouts of mutual and stock P-L insurers. The capital-constraint hypothesis 
posits that due to their higher costs in raising external capital, mutuals practice a lower 
dividend payout ratio than stocks in order to hoard capital in anticipation of future capital 
shocks. Agency theory, however, provides ambiguous predictions: a) by eliminating the 
owner-policyholder incentive conflicts, mutuals can pay more dividends because of the 
reduced marginal benefit from holding capital in mutuals; and b) because mutuals do not 
have enough management-control mechanisms (e.g., the market for corporate control and 
using stocks as incentive-based compensation), the pressure for managers to distribute 
profit and thereby dividends is low.  
Using a large sample of unaffiliated U.S. P-L insurance firms, we find that: a) 
mutual insurers consistently exhibit a lower dividend payout ratio than stock insurers and 
the difference is about 4 percentage points; b) both stock and mutual insurers’ dividend 
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payouts appear to be “sticky”, however, mutuals tend to adjust toward their target 
dividend payout ratios more slowly than do stock insurers. These results provide more 
support for the capital-constraint hypothesis and/or the higher agency costs of equity in 
mutual insurers.  
Since Harrginton and Niehaus (2002) find that mutual insurers appear to have a 
higher target capital level than stock insurers, our results suggest that one reason for the 
observed higher capital level in mutuals is the lower dividend payout ratio. Therefore, 
organizational differences in mutual and stock insurance firms do help shape different 
corporate financial decisions (e.g., dividend policies). Our results also show that mutual 
P-L insurers at least are less competitive than stock insurers on dividend payouts to 
owners. Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to further explore the 
aspects in which mutuals may excel and continue to survive as a corporate form. It is also 
interesting to examine the dividend payouts of mutual versus stock firms in the banking 
industry. Finally, using a short time-series (seven years) is a limitation of our study and 
future studies should use more recent data to assess the tenor of our results. 
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Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A 
 Mutuals (1385) Stocks (1484) Difference 
Variables Mean Std.  Dev. Median Mean 
Std.  
Dev. Median t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
z-stat 
DIV1 0.056 0.275 0.000 0.393 6.615 0.000 -1.96 b -15.9 c 
LAGDIV1 0.051 0.263 0.000 0.378 6.601 0.000 -1.91 a -16.1 c 
DIV2 0.056 0.275 0.000 0.358 6.608 0.000 -1.76 a -13.0 c 
LAGDIV2 0.050 0.262 0.000 0.346 6.594 0.000 -1.73 a -13.2 c 
SIZE 7.018 0.766 7.036 7.343 0.665 7.301 -12.1 c -11.1 c 
LEV 0.434 0.239 0.484 0.537 0.212 0.595 -12.1 c -11.9 c 
GROW 0.137 2.070 0.042 0.184 1.337 0.046 -0.74 -1.13 
PROF 0.036 0.067 0.037 0.068 0.272 0.053 -4.35 c -9.36 c 
LAGPROF 0.037 0.066 0.037 0.070 0.272 0.056 -4.65 c -10.5 c 
FCF 0.035 0.063 0.033 0.062 0.092 0.049 -9.39 c  -11.4 c 
EARISK 0.058 0.045 0.047 0.062 0.062 0.044 -2.25 b 1.46 
AUTO 0.128 0.245 0.000 0.225 0.358 0.000 -8.54 c -9.08 c 
HOMEOWN 0.232 0.240 0.171 0.033 0.114 0.000 28.0 c   27.4 c 
FIRE 0.199 0.275 0.074 0.025 0.092 0.000 22.4 c   30.2 c 
COMPER 0.093 0.183 0.000 0.071 0.185 0.000 3.19 c   10.2 c 
INLANDM 0.017 0.067 0.013 0.022 0.104 0.000 -1.51   12.9 c 
OCEAN 0.055 0.071 0.000 0.013 0.099 0.000 -2.44 b -7.81 c 
ALLIED 0.069 0.141 0.020 0.014 0.077 0.000 12.8 c   27.9 c 
WORKER 0.026 0.129 0.000 0.090 0.246 0.000 -8.75 c -7.24 c 
 
Panel B 
Type of 
Insurers 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
observations paying 
dividends 
Percentages of 
observations paying 
dividends 
Mutuals 1385 159 11.48% 
Stocks 1484 557 37.53% 
1. The total number of observations is 2869 and it is based on observations after the exclusion of negative 
dividend payout ratios (including their lags) that arise due to operating losses. 107 observations were lost 
due to this exclusion. 
2. DIV1 = the aggregate of policyholder and owner dividends ÷ the current net earnings before dividends. 
LAGDIV1 = one-year lag of DIV1. DIV2 = owner dividends ÷ the current net earnings before dividends. 
LAGDIV2 = one-year lag of DIV2. MUTUAL: 1 = mutual and 0 = stock firms. SIZE = logarithm of total 
(admitted) assets at the year beginning. LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of total assets at 
the year beginning. GROW = annual growth in net premium written. PROF = profitability, measured by the 
net income before dividends and tax in year t ÷ the total assets of year t-1. LAGPROF = one-year lag of 
PROF. FCF = annual before-dividend free cash flow ÷ the book value of total assets. EARISK = earnings 
volatility over the previous five years, computed in the manner of Bradley et al. (1984). AUTO, 
HOMEOWN, FIRE, COMPER, INLANDM, OCEAN, ALLIED and WORKER represents the proportion of 
earned premium income from personal auto physical damage and liability insurance, homeowners 
insurance, fire insurance, commercial multi-perils, inland marine, ocean marine, allied lines, and workers’ 
compensation, respectively. 
3. a,b,c = statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tailed).  
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficient Matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
DIV1 (1) -              
LAGDIV1 (2) 0.54c -             
DIV2 (3) 0.91c 0.48c -            
LAGDIV2 (4) 0.49c 0.92c 0.54c -           
MUTUAL (5) -0.21c -0.20c -0.16c -0.16c -          
SIZE (6) 0.24c 0.21c 0.19c 0.17c -0.22c -         
LEV (7) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.23c 0.53c -        
GROW (8) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04b -0.04b -       
PROF (9) 0.07c 0.07c 0.06c 0.06c -0.08c -0.01 -0.03a 0.01 -      
LAGPROF (10) 0.08c 0.07c 0.08c 0.06c -0.08c 0.05c -0.07c 0.19c 0.13c -     
FCF (11) 0.13c 0.14c 0.12c 0.13c -0.17c 0.01 -0.05c 0.04b 0.31c 0.17c -    
EARISK (12) -0.09c -0.10c -0.08c -0.09c -0.04b -0.25c -0.02 0.01 0.12c 0.10c 0.16c -   
AUTO (13) -0.05c -0.05c -0.02 -0.04b -0.16c 0.11c 0.25c -0.03a -0.06c -0.05c -0.08c 0.04b -  
HOMEOWN (14) -0.20c -0.20c -0.18c -0.18c 0.47c -0.09c -0.14c -0.02 -0.05c -0.07c -0.16c -0.01 -0.16c - 
FIRE (15) -0.15c -0.12c -0.14c -0.11c 0.40c -0.50c -0.51c 0.06c -0.02 -0.02 -0.07c 0.04b -0.25c 0.05c 
COMPER (16) -0.01 -0.03a 0.02 -0.01 0.06c 0.07c 0.10c -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04b -0.05c -0.16c 0.05c 
INLANDM (17) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03a -0.02 -0.02 -0.04b 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 c 0.01 
OCEAN (18) 0.03a 0.03a 0.04b 0.05c -0.05c 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.09c 0.08c 0.14c 0.08c -0.05c -0.06c 
ALLIED (19) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03a 0.24c -0.22c -0.32c -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.10c -0.17 c 0.01 
WORKER (20) 0.09c 0.09c 0.05c 0.05c -0.16c 0.17c 0.22c -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04b -0.14c -0.16c 
 
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
COMPER (16) -0.11c -    
INLANDM (17) -0.02 -0.02 -   
OCEAN (18) -0.05c -0.04b -0.01 -  
ALLIED (19) 0.32 c -0.10c -0.02 -0.02 - 
WORKER (20) -0.13c -0.05c -0.03a -0.02 -0.09c 
1. As there are some very high values in the dividend payout ratios, the results are based on a sample after excluding observations with payout ratios over their 99% 
percentiles.  
2. DIV1 = the aggregate of policyholder and owner dividends ÷ the current net earnings before dividends. LAGDIV1 = one-year lag of DIV1. DIV2 = owner dividends ÷ the 
current net earnings before dividends. LAGDIV2 = one-year lag of DIV2. MUTUAL: 1 = mutual and 0 = stock firms. SIZE = logarithm of total (admitted) assets at the year 
beginning. LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of total assets at the year beginning. GROW = annual growth in net premium written. PROF = profitability, 
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measured by the net income before dividends and tax in year t ÷ the total assets of year t-1. LAGPROF = one-year lag of PROF. FCF = annual before-dividend free cash 
flow ÷ the book value of total assets. EARISK = earnings volatility over the previous five years, computed in the manner of Bradley et al. (1984). AUTO, HOMEOWN, FIRE, 
COMPER, INLANDM, OCEAN, ALLIED and WORKER represents the proportion of earned premium income from personal auto physical damage and liability insurance, 
homeowners insurance, fire insurance, commercial multi-perils, inland marine, ocean marine, allied lines, and workers’ compensation, respectively. 
2 a, b, c: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 3: Multivariate Results of Tobit Analysis (Dependent Variable = DIV1) 
  Pooled 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Constant ? -0.312c 
(0.038) 
-0.121c 
(0.037) 
-0.284c 
(0.056) 
-0.161c 
(0.058) 
-0.234c 
(0.072) 
-0.250c 
(0.060) 
-0.258c 
(0.086) 
-0.457c 
(0.088) 
MUTUAL ? -0.037c 
(0.009) 
-0.015b 
(0.007) 
-0.039c 
(0.010) 
-0.030b 
(0.012) 
-0.042c 
(0.015) 
-0.018b 
(0.009) 
-0.036b 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
LAGDIV1 + 0.148
c 
(0.017) 
0.106c 
(0.023) 
0.160c 
(0.028) 
0.174c 
(0.028) 
0.095c 
(0.023) 
0.088c 
(0.021) 
0.121c 
(0.028) 
0.143c 
(0.029) 
SIZE + 0.041c 
(0.005) 
0.014c 
(0.005) 
0.032c 
(0.007) 
0.021c 
(0.008) 
0.027c 
(0.010) 
0.032c 
(0.008) 
0.031c 
(0.012) 
0.055c 
(0.012) 
LEV - -0.068c 
(0.018) 
-0.027b 
(0.016) 
-0.010 
(0.021) 
-0.043a 
(0.028) 
-0.004 
(0.034) 
-0.034a 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.039) 
-0.068b 
(0.038) 
GROW - -0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.012b 
(0.007) 
0.009b 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.027b 
(0.016) 
-0.023b 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
PROF + 0.020a 
(0.013) 
-0.023 
(0.063) 
0.012 
(0.082) 
-0.007 
(0.067) 
0.132a 
(0.084) 
0.123a 
(0.085) 
-0.005 
(0.021) 
0.382c 
(0.130) 
LAGPROF + 0.032a 
(0.021) 
0.139c 
(0.048) 
0.164c 
(0.063) 
0.377c 
(0.093) 
0.233c 
(0.088) 
0.020 
(0.066) 
0.324c 
(0.116) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
FCF + 0.118b 
(0.054) 
0.182b 
(0.091) 
0.037 
(0.082) 
-0.095a 
(0.054) 
-0.023 
(0.081) 
0.120a 
(0.081) 
0.135 
(0.118) 
-0.074 
(0.133) 
EARISK - -0.211c 
(0.067) 
-0.284c 
(0.081) 
-0.238b 
(0.108) 
-0.212b 
(0.109) 
-0.477c 
(0.154) 
-0.216c 
(0.085) 
-0.368c 
(0.150) 
-0.097 
(0.132) 
AUTO ? -0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.043b 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.021) 
HOMEOWN ? -0.095c 
(0.032) 
-0.044a 
(0.024) 
0.014 
(0.025) 
-0.090c 
(0.034) 
-0.059 
(0.038) 
-0.045a 
(0.024) 
-0.182c 
(0.053) 
-0.120c 
(0.042) 
FIRE ? -0.037 
(0.028) 
-0.057b 
(0.024) 
0.064b 
(0.027) 
-0.089b 
(0.035) 
-0.003 
(0.040) 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
-0.094b 
(0.044) 
0.022 
(0.038) 
COMPER ? 0.020 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.048 
(0.031) 
0.062b 
(0.031) 
INLANDM ? 0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.049 
(0.036) 
0.105c 
(0.038) 
0.050 
(0.037) 
-0.022 
(0.044) 
-0.069 
(0.078) 
-0.048 
(0.081) 
0.003 
(0.070) 
OCEAN ? -0.037 
(0.031) 
-0.017 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.044) 
-0.137b 
(0.064) 
-0.078 
(0.072) 
-0.051 
(0.044) 
-0.191b 
(0.097) 
-0.158 
(0.090) 
ALLIED ? 0.031 
(0.032) 
0.110c 
(0.029) 
-0.060 
(0.039) 
-0.007 
(0.039) 
0.011 
(0.049) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.067 
(0.052) 
0.023 
(0.049) 
WORKER ? 0.014 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.030 
(0.022) 
0.029 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
0.026 
(0.030) 
Year dummies ? Yes no No no no no no no 
Obs  2813 445 444 419 403 380 363 359 
1. DIV1 = the aggregate of policyholder and owner dividends ÷ the current net earnings before dividends. LAGDIV1 
= one-year lag of DIV1. MUTUAL: 1 = mutual and 0 = stock firms. SIZE = logarithm of total (admitted) assets at the 
year beginning. LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of total assets at the year beginning. GROW = 
annual growth in net premium written. PROF = profitability, measured by the net income before dividends and tax 
in year t ÷ the total assets of year t-1. LAGPROF = one-year lag of PROF. FCF = annual before-dividend free cash 
flow ÷ the book value of total assets. EARISK = earnings volatility over the previous five years, computed in the 
manner of Bradley et al. (1984). AUTO, HOMEOWN, FIRE, COMPER, INLANDM, OCEAN, ALLIED and 
WORKER represents the proportion of earned premium income from personal auto physical damage and liability 
insurance, homeowners insurance, fire insurance, commercial multi-perils, inland marine, ocean marine, allied lines, 
and workers’ compensation, respectively.  
2. a, b, c: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. One-tailed p-values are reported when the sign of a 
uni-directional variable’s coefficient is as expected; otherwise, two-tailed p-values are used. Numbers reported in 
the parentheses are standard errors. Marginal effects are reported as estimates of coefficients. The pooled analysis 
reports standard errors clustered at firm level that are robust to unknown heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial 
correlation. The sample included in the regression has been trimmed at the 99th percentile of DIV1 and LAGDIV1.  
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Table 4: Partial Adjustment Speed of Dividend Payouts: Mutuals vs. Stocks (Tobit 
Model) 
Dependent Var. = DIV1 Pooled 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Constant ? -0.285c 
(0.035) 
-0.110c 
(0.035) 
-0.271c 
(0.056) 
-0.150c 
(0.058) 
-0.181c 
(0.065) 
-0.217c 
(0.055) 
-0.222c 
(0.083) 
-0.394c 
(0.082) 
MUTUAL ? -0.057c 
(0.011) 
-0.027c 
(0.009) 
-0.045c 
(0.011) 
-0.040c 
(0.014) 
-0.067c 
(0.017) 
-0.035c 
(0.011) 
-0.068c 
(0.020) 
-0.050c 
(0.016) 
LAGDIV1 + 0.115
c 
(0.017) 
0.085c 
(0.021) 
0.140c 
(0.030) 
0.159c 
(0.028) 
0.066c 
(0.021) 
0.066c 
(0.018) 
0.078c 
(0.028) 
0.104c 
(0.026) 
SIZE + 0.038c 
(0.005) 
0.013c 
(0.005) 
0.032c 
(0.007) 
0.020c 
(0.008) 
0.021c 
(0.009) 
0.028c 
(0.008) 
0.027c 
(0.012) 
0.048c 
(0.011) 
LEV - -0.064c 
(0.017) 
-0.026b 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
-0.041a 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.031) 
-0.034a 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.037) 
-0.056a 
(0.034) 
GROW - -0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.011b 
(0.006) 
0.008b 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.028b 
(0.016) 
-0.017a 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
PROF + 0.018a 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.061) 
0.024 
(0.079) 
-0.016 
(0.065) 
0.127a 
(0.078) 
0.112a 
(0.081) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
0.364c 
(0.122) 
LAGPROF + 0.030a 
(0.020) 
0.131c 
(0.046) 
0.166c 
(0.062) 
0.369c 
(0.093) 
0.200c 
(0.080) 
0.033 
(0.063) 
0.333c 
(0.112) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
FCF + 0.107b 
(0.049) 
0.159b 
(0.087) 
0.030 
(0.079) 
-0.092a 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.072) 
0.106a 
(0.077) 
0.107 
(0.114) 
-0.094 
(0.128) 
EARISK - -0.204c 
(0.061) 
-0.278c 
(0.080) 
-0.230b 
(0.104) 
-0.215b 
(0.108) 
-0.422c 
(0.141) 
-0.222c 
(0.083) 
-0.368c 
(0.144) 
-0.103 
(0.118) 
AUTO ? -0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.043b 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
HOMEOWN ? -0.068b 
(0.028) 
-0.030 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.025) 
-0.079b 
(0.034) 
-0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
-0.128b 
(0.052) 
-0.072a 
(0.038) 
FIRE ? -0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.045a 
(0.023) 
0.069b 
(0.027) 
-0.078b 
(0.036) 
0.021 
(0.037) 
0.012 
(0.024) 
-0.061 
(0.043) 
0.052 
(0.035) 
COMPER ? 0.026a 
(0.014) 
0.027a 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.054a 
(0.030) 
0.072b 
(0.029) 
INLANDM ? 0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.045 
(0.034) 
0.099c 
(0.037) 
0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.040) 
-0.058 
(0.069) 
-0.041 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.062) 
OCEAN ? -0.027 
(0.033) 
-0.013 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.043) 
-0.128b 
(0.063) 
-0.073 
(0.065) 
-0.042 
(0.041) 
-0.166a 
(0.091) 
-0.129 
(0.079) 
ALLIED ? 0.007 
(0.028) 
0.100c 
(0.027) 
-0.084a 
(0.044) 
-0.017 
(0.040) 
-0.022 
(0.044) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
0.064 
(0.050) 
0.013 
(0.045) 
WORKER ? 0.011 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
-0.033 
(0.021) 
0.030 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.027) 
MUTUAL×LAGDIV1 + 0.118c 
(0.030) 
0.061c 
(0.025) 
0.037a 
(0.029) 
0.057a 
(0.039) 
0.160c 
(0.049) 
0.110c 
(0.035) 
0.168c 
(0.057) 
0.169c 
(0.049) 
Year dummies ? yes no no no no no no no 
Obs  2813 445 444 419 403 380 363 359 
1. DIV1 = the aggregate of policyholder and owner dividends ÷ the current net earnings before dividends. LAGDIV1 
= one-year lag of DIV1. MUTUAL: 1 = mutual and 0 = stock firms. SIZE = logarithm of total (admitted) assets at the 
year beginning. LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of total assets at the year beginning. GROW = 
annual growth in net premium written. PROF = profitability, measured by the net income before dividends and tax 
in year t ÷ the total assets of year t-1. LAGPROF = one-year lag of PROF. FCF = annual before-dividend free cash 
flow ÷ the book value of total assets. EARISK = earnings volatility over the previous five years, computed in the 
manner of Bradley et al. (1984). AUTO, HOMEOWN, FIRE, COMPER, INLANDM, OCEAN, ALLIED and 
WORKER represents the proportion of earned premium income from personal auto physical damage and liability 
insurance, homeowners insurance, fire insurance, commercial multi-perils, inland marine, ocean marine, allied lines, 
and workers’ compensation, respectively.  
2. a, b, c: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. One-tailed p-values are reported when the sign of a 
uni-directional variable’s coefficient is as expected; otherwise, two-tailed p-values are used. Numbers reported in 
the parentheses are standard errors. Marginal effects are reported as estimates of coefficients. The pooled analysis 
  32
reports standard errors clustered at firm level that are robust to unknown heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial 
correlation. The sample included in the regression has been trimmed at the 99th percentile of DIV1 and LAGDIV1.  
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Table 5: Robustness Checks (Tobit Analysis, Dependent Variable = DIV2) 
  Pooled 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Constant ? -0.246c 
(0.038) 
-0.101c 
(0.037) 
-0.209c 
(0.048) 
-0.144c 
(0.048) 
-0.133b 
(0.062) 
-0.186b 
(0.053) 
-0.154b 
(0.074) 
-0.303c 
(0.073) 
MUTUAL ? -0.044c 
(0.010) 
-0.020b 
(0.009) 
-0.028c 
(0.009) 
-0.029c 
(0.011) 
-0.070c 
(0.017) 
-0.033c 
(0.011) 
-0.052c 
(0.017) 
-0.040c 
(0.015) 
LAGDIV2 + 0.123
c 
(0.012) 
0.095c 
(0.023) 
0.142c 
(0.029) 
0.170c 
(0.028) 
0.075c 
(0.022) 
0.062c 
(0.018) 
0.095c 
(0.030) 
0.092c 
(0.026) 
SIZE + 0.030c 
(0.005) 
0.011b 
(0.005) 
0.023c 
(0.006) 
0.016c 
(0.007) 
0.013a 
(0.008) 
0.022c 
(0.007) 
0.015a 
(0.010) 
0.032c 
(0.009) 
LEV - -0.049c 
(0.018) 
-0.024a 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
-0.029 
(0.032) 
GROW - -0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.009a 
(0.006) 
0.009c 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.030b 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
PROF + 0.015a 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.069) 
0.007 
(0.070) 
-0.014 
(0.058) 
0.091a 
(0.070) 
0.134a 
(0.083) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
0.359c 
(0.122) 
LAGPROF + 0.023a 
(0.017) 
0.105b 
(0.047) 
0.141c 
(0.056) 
0.264c 
(0.075) 
0.192c 
(0.076) 
0.001 
(0.063) 
0.263c 
(0.099) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
FCF + 0.075b 
(0.043) 
0.081 
(0.099) 
0.008 
(0.070) 
-0.090b 
(0.044) 
-0.026 
(0.069) 
0.076 
(0.077) 
0.103 
(0.104) 
-0.117 
(0.133) 
EARISK - -0.145c 
(0.060) 
-0.225c 
(0.080) 
-0.205b 
(0.093) 
-0.138a 
(0.089) 
-0.384c 
(0.134) 
-0.215c 
(0.084) 
-0.261b 
(0.136) 
-0.087 
(0.108) 
AUTO ? -0.001 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.030b 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.043b 
(0.018) 
HOMEOWN ? -0.055b 
(0.027) 
-0.029 
(0.023) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.057b 
(0.028) 
-0.003 
(0.034) 
-0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.105b 
(0.046) 
-0.046 
(0.035) 
FIRE ? -0.003 
(0.026) 
-0.041a 
(0.023) 
0.043a 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.028) 
0.029 
(0.035) 
0.016 
(0.024) 
-0.039 
(0.040) 
0.056a 
(0.033) 
COMPER ? 0.031b 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
0.019 
(0.025) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
0.069b 
(0.028) 
0.081c 
(0.027) 
INLANDM ? 0.025b 
(0.010) 
-0.033 
(0.033) 
0.069b 
(0.031) 
0.059a 
(0.030) 
-0.003 
(0.038) 
-0.040 
(0.062) 
-0.014 
(0.069) 
0.022 
(0.056) 
OCEAN ? -0.011 
(0.029) 
-0.003 
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
-0.104a 
(0.053) 
-0.045 
(0.060) 
-0.019 
(0.039) 
-0.131 
(0.082) 
-0.102 
(0.072) 
ALLIED ? 0.010 
(0.023) 
0.090c 
(0.026) 
-0.087b 
(0.040) 
-0.017 
(0.033) 
0.014 
(0.042) 
0.036 
(0.029) 
0.061 
(0.045) 
0.026 
(0.042) 
WORKER ? -0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
-0.042b 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.014 
(0.027) 
MUTUAL×LAGDIV2 + 0.103c 
(0.029) 
0.062c 
(0.027) 
0.014 
(0.026) 
0.024 
(0.032) 
0.193c 
(0.054) 
0.120c 
(0.038) 
0.150c 
(0.055) 
0.169c 
(0.049) 
Year dummies ? yes no no no no no no no 
Obs  2821 445 444 419 405 381 365 362 
1. DIV2 = owner dividends ÷ the current net earnings before dividends. LAGDIV2 = one-year lag of DIV2. MUTUAL: 
1 = mutual and 0 = stock firms. SIZE = logarithm of total (admitted) assets at the year beginning. LEV = the ratio of 
total liabilities to the book value of total assets at the year beginning. GROW = annual growth in net premium 
written. PROF = profitability, measured by the net income before dividends and tax in year t ÷ the total assets of 
year t-1. LAGPROF = one-year lag of PROF. FCF = annual before-dividend free cash flow ÷ the book value of total 
assets. EARISK = earnings volatility over the previous five years, computed in the manner of Bradley et al. (1984). 
AUTO, HOMEOWN, FIRE, COMPER, INLANDM, OCEAN, ALLIED and WORKER represents the proportion of 
earned premium income from personal auto physical damage and liability insurance, homeowners insurance, fire 
insurance, commercial multi-perils, inland marine, ocean marine, allied lines, and workers’ compensation, 
respectively.  
2. a, b, c: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. One-tailed p-values are reported when the sign of a 
uni-directional variable’s coefficient is as expected; otherwise, two-tailed p-values are used. Numbers reported in 
the parentheses are standard errors. Marginal effects are reported as estimates of coefficients. The pooled analysis 
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reports standard errors clustered at firm level that are robust to unknown heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial 
correlation. The sample included in the regression has been trimmed at the 99th percentile of DIV2 and LAGDIV2.  
